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Abstract  
This paper assesses contagion and competition as alternative types of stock market spillovers 
arising from sovereign rating actions. Our research design is based on the premise that the 
type of spillover effects within and between groups of countries will be influenced by the 
sovereign rating level, split ratings and the extent of rating convergence i.e. specific types of 
rating action will induce different and/or stronger effects. The results reveal a clear pattern 
whereby downgrades of high-rated countries induce contagion to both high and low-rated 
countries, while downgrades of low-rated countries reveal the opposite i.e. they induce 
competitive effects. Split ratings are found to intensify stock market spillover effects. Rating 
convergence/divergence across similarly-rated sovereigns has a meaningful influence on the 
spillover effects. For the downgrades of high-rated countries, rating convergence mitigates 
the contagion effect to other high-rated countries in the region, but has very limited effect on 
the contagion to low-rated countries. For downgrades of low-rated countries, rating 
convergence strengthens the competitive effect on other low-rated countries but has little 
effect on the competitive impact on high-rated countries. 
 
JEL classification: G11, G14, G15. 







 The role of credit rating agencies (CRAs)1 has been under the spotlight during the recent 
global financial crisis. Their failures in rating structured finance products had a major influence 
on the US sub-prime crisis and its consequences. This motivated a tightening of regulations 
surrounding the CRA industry, especially in the US (e.g. Dimitrov et al., 2015), and the 
European Union. The regulatory debate ensured that CRAs maintained a high profile globally, 
which was reinforced by further controversy arising from the timing and severity of their 
sovereign rating downgrades during the European debt crisis. Subsequent to the latter crisis, a 
‘new normal’ has emerged in the form of an increasing prevalence of differences of opinion 
among CRAs on sovereign ratings, especially in Europe (e.g. Vu et al., 2015). 
The above developments have contributed to a burgeoning academic literature which 
studies the impact of rating actions (e.g. Baum et al., 2016; Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015; 
Caselli et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016; Drago and Gallo, 2016).2 This recent literature has 
addressed a number of angles on the impact of CRA sovereign and corporate rating actions on 
economies and financial markets. For sovereign rating actions, several papers focus on the 
own-country effects, but as in several historical crisis episodes, the European debt crisis 
spotlighted the potential spillover effects of these credit actions. This prior literature has 
identified different types of spillover, broadly termed as contagion (or common) versus 
competition (or differential) effects. In this paper, several strands of related literature inform 
the development of competing hypotheses for contagion versus competition effects across 
countries in high rating and low rating categories. Our approach also has connections with 
literature on the competition-contagion effects arising from corporate rating actions (e.g. Jorion 
and Zhang, 2010; Wengner et al., 2015). 
                                                          
1 The ‘big 3’ CRAs have been the focus of attention, namely Fitch Ratings, Moody’s Investors Service and 
Standard & Poor’s Corporation (Fitch, Moody’s and S&P hereafter). 
2 The term ‘rating actions’ refers to rating changes, outlook changes and watchlist changes. 
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Sovereign rating actions have demonstrated a persistent and widespread influence in 
recent years, especially in Europe. In June 2016, CRAs’ downgrades of the UK sovereign rating 
and the European Union (EU) quickly followed the UK’s ‘leave’ vote in its European 
referendum (‘Brexit’).3 Research on the sovereign (rather than corporate) rating sector is 
arguably more insightful due to the strong influence of the ‘sovereign ceiling’ and sovereign-
bank linkages (e.g. Alsakka et al., 2014). Sovereign rating actions very frequently drive rating 
actions at the corporate and bank levels (e.g. Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida et al., 2017; 
Borenzstein et al., 2013; Huang and Shen, 2015). In addition, banks are strongly affected by 
sovereign rating actions for their home country and internationally, due to their holdings of 
sovereign debt, collateral, and implicit government guarantees (e.g. BIS, 2011; Blundell-
Wignall and Slovik, 2010; Caselli et al., 2016; De Bruckyere et al., 2013). Such influences 
imply that both domestic and international stock markets are potentially strongly affected by 
sovereign rating actions (e.g. Correa et al., 2014). 
This paper provides unique insights on the cross-country stock market spillover effects 
of sovereign rating actions. We focus on the Europe and Central Asia region (as defined by the 
World Bank). We select this region due to (i) it having witnessed a very high volume of 
sovereign rating actions during recent years; (ii) the European sovereign debt crisis; and (iii) 
the identification in prior literature that spillover effects of rating actions are stronger within a 
geographic region (e.g. Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). The 
paper addresses a number of gaps in prior literature. Firstly, we utilize the categorization of 
high-rated versus low-rated sovereigns to develop competing hypotheses on the potential 
contagion and competition types of spillover effects (both within and between groups). 
Secondly, the closely related literature has particularly neglected the potential impact of 
                                                          
3 The ‘unexpected’ S&P downgrade of Poland in January 2016 was another case where political (rather than 
economic or financial) factors instigated sovereign rating action. 
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differences of rating opinion across CRAs. Given the increasing prevalence of such ‘split 
ratings’, these are anticipated to be influential on the spillover evidence. Several closely related 
papers only use one CRA’s data hence are unable to account for this effect in any way (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2016; Drago and Gallo, 2016; Wengner et al., 2015). Relating to the quantification 
of split ratings, most prior papers ignore outlook and watch actions, which have been 
demonstrated to be a crucial component of the information content of CRA actions (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). Thirdly, we develop and apply a novel measure of inter-
country rating convergence to further test our anticipation that some types of rating actions are 
more influential on spillovers. 
 In brief, the results reveal a clear pattern whereby downgrades of high-rated countries 
induce contagion to both high and low-rated countries, while downgrades of low-rated 
countries reveal the opposite i.e. they induce competitive effects. Split ratings are found to 
intensify stock market spillover effects. Rating convergence/divergence across similarly-rated 
sovereigns has a meaningful influence on the spillover effects.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant prior 
literature and Section 3 develops the paper’s hypotheses. Section 4 explains the methodology 
and data. Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Context and Literature Review 
2.1. Institutional features of sovereign credit ratings 
Several studies suggest that sovereign rating levels and actions can be determined by 
quantitative economic and financial indicators such as GDP per capita, GDP growth, inflation, 
external debt, level of economic development and default history, as well as qualitative factors 
such as political and institutional environments (Afonso et al., 2011; Vu et al., 2017). These 
determinants capture the capacity as well as the willingness of the sovereign to meet its debt 
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obligations on time and as promised. However, the determinants and their weights are subject 
to periodic review and vary across CRAs (Hill et al., 2010). The models permit limited 
judgemental input from analysts. CRAs generally aim to assign ratings that remain stable over 
time and are not conditioned on the point of the economic cycle.  
The detailed process of sovereign credit risk assessments by CRAs is disclosed in their 
published methodologies (Fitch, 2017; Moody’s, 2016; S&P, 2014). For each sovereign rating 
action, CRAs now publish commentaries on the drivers for their decision. Fitch’s (2017) 
approach is based on four analytical pillars, as follows: (i) structural features of the economy 
including financial sector risk, political risk and governance factors; (ii) macroeconomic 
performance, policies and prospects; (iii) budget balances, the structure and sustainability of 
public debt and fiscal financing; (iv) external finances, including the sustainability of current 
account balances and capital flows, and the level and structure of external public and private 
debt. Moody’s (2016) approach is based on four key factors, as follows: (i) economic strength 
based on growth dynamics, scale of the economy and national income; (ii) institutional 
strength, which includes policy credibility and effectiveness; (iii) fiscal strength, including the 
government’s debt burden and debt affordability; (iv) susceptibility to political risk, 
government liquidity risk, banking sector risk and external vulnerability risk. S&P (2014) 
considers these five aspects: (i) institutional assessment of policymaking and political 
institutions, the transparency and accountability of institutions and debt payment; (ii) an 
economic assessment, which includes income levels, growth prospects, and economic 
diversity; (iii) external assessment which includes the status of the currency and the country's 
external liquidity; (iv) fiscal assessment and debt burden; (v) monetary assessment including 





2.2. Prior academic research   
 The European sovereign debt crisis has contributed to strong renewed academic and 
practitioner interest in the influence of CRAs’ sovereign rating actions upon financial markets 
and institutions. While some studies focus on own-country effects of these rating actions, others 
have a particular focus on spillover effects. Recent work has studied spillover effects of 
sovereign rating actions upon banks (Alsakka et al., 2014), bond markets (Afonso et al., 2012) 
and credit default swap (CDS) markets (Afonso et al., 2012; Drago and Gallo, 2016).4  
 Alsakka et al. (2014) investigate the sovereign-to-bank rating channel, using data from 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P. They report clear evidence that sovereign rating downgrades and 
negative watch signals have strong connections with bank rating downgrades during the 
European debt crisis. This effect is stronger in the peripheral European countries which were 
most affected by the crisis (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).  
Afonso et al. (2012) find that an increase in the event-country average rating induces 
spillover effects in non-event countries’ bond markets but not in CDS markets. While using 
data from the ‘big 3’ CRAs, unusually they specify the rating actions within an average rating 
function. They focus more on the upgrade cases, and do not investigate the peak of the 
European debt crisis in 2011-12; in this case the data sample ends in 2010. Baum et al. (2016) 
examine the effects of sovereign rating actions during the European debt crisis in 2010-2012. 
They find no significant impact on the exchange rate, but some effects on volatility. Of 
particular interest for our paper, they find that rating events significantly affect sovereign bond 
yields, and link this to the observation that investors rebalanced their portfolios to reduce their 
exposure to sovereigns with declining credit ratings.  
                                                          
4 Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) investigate similar issues for CDS markets but restrict the analysis to non-
European emerging markets. Bissondoyal-Bheenick et al. (2014) investigate related effects in Asia-Pacific 
markets only. Other papers have considered spillovers in higher moments of asset returns e.g. Afonso et al. (2014), 




 Böninghausen and Zabel (2015) find that bond market spillover reactions to sovereign 
downgrades are significantly stronger for countries within the same region. Drago and Gallo 
(2016) focus on spillovers within the Eurozone CDS market relating to sovereign rating actions 
(by S&P only). Contrary to many previous studies, they suggest that the information content 
of watch and outlook signals is very limited. This is a strongly counter-intuitive finding given 
that the role of watch and outlook is to improve rating accuracy i.e. rating adjustments are 
firstly evident in the watch and outlook sphere. In using data for only one CRA, the robustness 
of the above findings might be questionable. Additionally, the authors report significant 
contagion (to non-event countries) from downgrades but not from upgrades. 
 In considering the spillover effects of sovereign rating changes on economic growth, 
Chen et al. (2016) provide a rationale for distinguishing between ‘contagion’ and ‘competition’ 
at the country level. They identify that adverse output effects for non-event countries arise from 
differential (common) spillovers from event-country upgrades (downgrades). Similarly, Drago 
and Gallo (2016) draw a contrast between a common information effect and a flight to quality 
effect.5  
 Some corporate rating literature has focused on the possibility of both common 
(contagion) and differential (competition) effects of downgrades. In a notable contribution, 
Jorion and Zhang (2010) hypothesise that the contagion and competition effects on industry 
rivals will depend on the original credit quality of the downgraded firm. The downgrades of 
investment-grade firms are likely to induce contagion effects (i.e. negative spillovers) while 
the downgrades of speculative-grade firms are more likely to induce competition effects (i.e. 
positive news for firms in the same industry). Focusing on stock market returns, they find that 
industry rivals can be subject to both contagion and competition effects of rating actions. One 
particularly insightful aspect is their finding that these effects are strongly influenced by the 
                                                          
5 The latter was particularly evident in German government bond yields during the European crisis period. 
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rating level of the firm which receives the credit action. Among investment-grade firms, a 
contagion effect is prevalent. Among speculative-grade firms, a competition effect dominates.6  
 Despite the insights from this very recent body of research, important gaps and issues 
remain to be addressed. Firstly, in the European context, relatively little attention has been 
placed on the stock market effects of sovereign rating actions. An exception is Alsakka et al. 
(2017) who report strong evidence that S&P sovereign rating actions influence stock market 
reactions much more than Moody’s and Fitch. They also find that pre-event differences of 
opinion between CRAs (split ratings) influence the intensity of spillover effects in non-event 
countries. 
  Secondly, the literature reviewed in this section has ignored the potential impact of 
inter-CRA differences. A large group of the related papers use data from only one CRA (e.g. 
Chen et al., 2013; 2016; Drago and Gallo, 2016; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Gande and Parsley, 
2005; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Wengner et al., 2015),7 hence cannot begin to consider 
inter-CRA effects. Others pool data from multiple CRAs (e.g. using an average rating as in 
Afonso et al., 2012) or use multiple CRA event data while failing to consider the additional 
information present in the evident differences of opinion between CRAs (e.g. Afonso et al., 
2014; Baum et al., 2016; Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015; Do et al., 2014; Jorion and Zhang, 
2010). Others have shown the importance of differences across CRAs in sovereign rating 
actions (e.g. Hill and Faff, 2010). Incorporating CRA differences of opinion in the research 
design is highly important because split ratings have become the “new normal” in European 
                                                          
6 Wengner et al. (2015) consider the impact of S&P rating events on the CDS spreads of competitor firms. They 
report that both downgrades and upgrades induce spillovers, but the extent and significance varies across 
industries and has been stronger since 2007. Hu et al. (2016) analyze the spillover effects of corporate rating 
actions on the G7 stock markets, and report mixed findings across industries and countries. 
7 Generally, authors provide weak or implausible justifications for employing data from only one CRA e.g. only 
using S&P data because it is claimed to be ‘more active’ in taking rating actions and thereby somehow offers a 
better sample. A further example is Chen et al.’s (2016) statement that “S&P rating changes are also less likely to 
be anticipated by market investors and tend to precede the rating changes of other rating agencies” without 
providing any supporting citation. In contrast, Cantor et al. (2007, Exhibits 4A and 4B) demonstrate that fund 
managers and plan sponsors extensively use multiple CRAs not only one. 
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sovereign and bank ratings since the onset of the crisis period. For example, Alsakka et al. 
(2017) report sovereign rating disagreements in 63.1% of S&P-Moody’s comparisons and 
51.8% (52.9%) in Fitch-S&P (Fitch-Moody’s) comparisons, when considering ratings, watch 
and outlook status.8 A further important issue is that data from only one CRA does not enable 
event-study findings which are robust to contamination from the recent events of other CRAs. 
 Thirdly, we introduce a novel method of capturing inter-country effects of rating 
actions. A measure of rating convergence within high-rated and low-rated groups of countries 
is devised. This enables the investigation of hypotheses surrounding potentially different 
effects of rating actions dependent on the rating context of neighbouring or similarly-rated 
countries. This has not been addressed in any of the literature discussed above. 
 Fourth, the distinction between positive and negative spillovers deserves further 
investigation in the sovereign sphere because of the sovereign rating ceiling effect (e.g. Adelino 
and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida et al., 2017; Borensztein et al., 2013; Huang and Shen, 2015). 
Therefore, sovereign rating actions are the driving force for many of the spillovers reported in 
the corporate rating literature. Related to this, we demonstrate an alternative approach to the 
competition/contagion distinction, by grouping high-rated and low-rated sovereigns, across 
both event and non-event countries, thus enabling four-way comparisons. In this context, we 
have scope to bridge some of the approaches used in the corporate versus sovereign literature.  
Finally, Böninghausen and Zabel (2015) contend that the results of different event 
studies are not easily comparable or generalizable. Therefore, one cannot presume any given 
outcome when testing the impact of sovereign rating actions for different financial markets, 
geographical regions and time periods. Taken together, these gaps in the prior literature provide 
a clear agenda for this paper’s original contributions.  
                                                          
8 A given financial market may react very differently to rating actions which narrow or widen CRA differences 
of opinion (or lead to rating convergence/divergence). Such considerations have been shown to reveal more 




 This section explains the hypotheses to be tested in the paper. If the CRAs base their 
actions on existing publicly available information only, the efficient market hypothesis implies 
that stock prices will not react to credit rating signals. Prior literature demonstrates that 
sovereign rating news affects own-country equity markets and causes significant spillovers to 
other countries’ equity markets (e.g. Afonso et al., 2012; Brooks et al., 2004; Ferreira and 
Gama, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010). This implies that CRAs incorporate private information 
which is released into the public domain through credit signals (Brooks et al., 2004). Equity 
markets can be affected by sovereign credit signals due to the spillover effect from any 
sovereign distress to private debtors (Borensztein et al., 2013). This is triggered by measures 
such as inflationary financing, tax increases and potential imposition of direct capital controls, 
undertaken by a sovereign in financial difficulties. These could directly influence the 
corporates’ solvency and liquidity, and hence their ability to repay their financial obligations.  
Further, if market participants view credit news as country-specific, little spillover 
effect would be observed in other equity markets. However, there are many potential 
transmission channels through which sovereign rating signals may spillover to other countries’ 
equity markets (Almeida et al., 2017; Alsakka et al., 2014; Alter and Beyer, 2014; Arezki et 
al., 2011; Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Sy, 2009). These include: the globalized nature of financial 
markets, financial connections across countries, rational and irrational behaviour of investors, 
and changes in capital supply following rating news. These can in turn affect real economic 
activity, holdings of foreign sovereign debt by domestic corporates, interbank lending, 
portfolio rebalancing, information asymmetries among market participants, rating-based 
triggers (e.g. heavy use of ratings in regulation and central banks’ collateral rules) and linkages 
between sovereign and non-sovereign ratings. See also Section 4.1 for further discussion on 
spillover channels in the countries included in the study sample. 
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In order to investigate the contagion versus competition aspect, we define a high-rated 
group of countries as ‘A’, which comprises sovereigns with an average rating level within the 
categories of ‘AAA/Aaa’, ‘AA/Aa’ or ‘A’ at the end of the day on which a rating action 
occurred. 9 The low-rated group of sovereigns ‘B’ comprises sovereigns with an average rating 
level within the categories of BBB+/Baa1 or below at the end of the day of a rating action. 
Rating observations in the latter group are almost all between BBB+/Baa1 and B-/B3, hence 
the group is labelled here as ‘B’. Rating actions are defined both in terms of being within the 
same group and between groups. For example, a rating downgrade can be from AAA to AA 
(same group) or from A to BBB+ (between groups), but the rating level of a sovereign at the 
end of the day of the rating action determines whether it belongs to group ‘A’ or ‘B’.10 
 Figures 1 and 2 summarize the potential spillover effects across the two groups, for 
downgrades and upgrades of the event country (E denotes the event country and NE denotes 
the non-event country to which a potential spillover occurs), respectively. The geographical 
composition of the sample (see Section 4) provides a context which underpins the plausibility 
of underlying financial and trade channels to explain spillover effects (e.g. membership of the 
European Union, the Eurozone and/or the European Economic Area). The formulation of the 
hypotheses draws from the prior literature discussed in Section 2. Overall, the prior literature 
suggests that one should expect stronger effects to emanate from downgrades compared to 
upgrades. For all cases in Figures 1 and 2, the null hypothesis is that no spillover occurs, neither 
of contagion nor competition types. There are two competing alternative hypotheses of 
contagion and competition in each case (which are verified based on significantly 
positive/negative coefficients in the estimated results). 
                                                          
9 In the asset management industry, a criteria of ‘6 As’ is sometimes applied in fixed income investment i.e. 
AAA/AA/A. Some further justification for this categorisation is provided in Cantor et al. (2007, Exhibits 3A and 
3B). 
10 Within the sample, there are only 26 rating actions whereby sovereigns’ average rating crossed the boundary of 
the groups (13 actions from ‘A’ to ‘B’, and 13 actions from ‘B’ to ‘A’).  
11 
 
 Some authors consider that contagion is the predominant type of spillover (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002), whereby all rating actions contribute to a pro-cyclical 
phenomenon. Others propose that contagion (common) spillovers will be evident for 
downgrades while competition (differential) spillovers will occur with upgrades (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2016). Others differentiate in terms of the debt issuer’s credit quality. In the corporate 
setting, Jorion and Zhang (2010) propose competitive effects among lower quality issuers and 
contagion effects among the higher quality issuers. 
 In considering several of the hypotheses, the concepts of market access and flows of 
funding are crucial. Some hypotheses imply a more restricted (increased) market access for B-
rated countries when they are downgraded (upgraded). Also, downgraded (upgraded) 
sovereigns will potentially attract decreased (increased) fund flows to the advantage 
(detriment) of others. 
In addition, we propose hypotheses for the contexts of inter-CRA split ratings and inter-country 
rating convergence (motivated by prior literature and incorporated in the research design in 
Section 4). It is hypothesized that rating actions which widen splits will increase ambiguity 
surrounding the sovereign’s rating status (see Vu et al., 2015) and will thereby induce a stronger 
market reaction to the news. Therefore, we expect a strengthening of spillover (either 
competition or contagion effects) when a CRA action induces a wider split rating for a given 
country. Similarly, a weakened spillover effect is expected in cases where the rating action has 
the consequence of narrowing or removing the split rating across CRAs. At the inter-country 
level, when a given CRA action induces greater rating convergence (within either the ‘A’ or 
‘B’ groups), we propose that this will reduce the surprise content of a rating action and therefore 
mitigate any spillovers. Similarly, rating actions which cause greater divergence in ratings 
(within either the ‘A’ or ‘B’ groups) will introduce additional uncertainty or ambiguity about 
sovereign credit quality and are hypothesized to be characterized by stronger spillover effects.  
12 
 
Figure 1: Competing hypotheses for downgrades of event countries (E) 
E is A-rated (a) If NE (non-event country) is also A-rated: 
 
H1: Contagion or common effect (-ve, i.e. negative coefficient expected): Following 
the evidence of Jorion and Zhang (2010), the A-rated downgrade will negatively 
affect similarly-rated NE stock markets. This would reflect a revision of market 
expectations. 
 
H2: Competition or differential effect (+ve): A positive spillover effect is anticipated. 
Downgrades of a high-rated sovereign weaken its relative credit standing compared 
to other high-rated countries. The latter may thereby generate investors’ portfolio 
shifts i.e. attract increased financial flows e.g. to the stock market. Such competitive 
effects are consistent with the findings of Wengner et al. (2015). 
 
(b) If NE is B-rated: 
 
H1: Contagion effect (-ve): A negative spillover could arise because the downgrade is 
indicative of weakening economic circumstances for all countries in the region. This 
perspective of contagion is supported by e.g. Afonso et al. (2012), Gande and Parsley 
(2005), Chen et al (2016). 
 
H2: Competition effect (+ve): No differential spillover is anticipated. There is 
unlikely to be a strong benefit for lower-rated countries nor any capital flight from A-
rated to B-rated. 
 
E is B-rated (a) If NE is also B-rated: 
 
H1: Contagion effect (-ve). A common and negative spillover could arise because the 
downgrade is indicative of weakening economic circumstances for lower-rated 
countries in the region. This perspective of contagion is supported by e.g. Afonso et 
al. (2012), Gande and Parsley (2005), Chen et al (2016). It is also evident in cases 
such as the effects of B-rated Greece’s downgrades upon other peripheral Eurozone 
markets during the European crisis. 
 
H2: Competition effect (+ve), i.e. B-rated NE stock markets will benefit. In the 
corporate context, Jorion and Zhang (2010) present evidence that makes a case for 
this. At the country level, this implies that funds flow out from the event country 
market yet are reinvested in similarly risky NE markets within the same region. 
 
(b) If NE is A-rated: 
 
H1: Contagion effect (-ve): The downgrade is perceived to reflect a wider economic 
malaise in the region and therefore negatively affects even the higher rated NE 
countries’ stock markets. This would reflect a revision of market expectations. 
Afonso et al (2012) take this view. 
 
H2: Competition effect (+ve): These downgrades are good news for the ‘A’ rated NE 
countries’ stock markets. Such a positive spillover effect could be characterized as 
‘flight to quality’ or ‘flight to liquidity’ (for a detailed discussion, see e.g. Beber et 
al., 2009). Specific examples include the strong positive effects on German bonds 
(see Baum et al., 2016) and Swiss franc-denominated assets following negative rating 





Figure 2: Competing hypotheses for upgrades of event countries (E) 
E is A-rated (a) If NE is also A-rated: 
H1: Contagion effect (+ve): A common and positive spillover could arise because the 
upgrade is indicative of potentially improving economic circumstances for higher 
rated countries in the region. In the context of the European crisis, this could reflect 
likely events in the upturn or recovery period. 
 
H2: Competition effect (-ve): Other A-rated countries will face negative stock market 
returns due to their reduced relative credit standing i.e. the event country market 
becomes more attractive. It could generate a shift in investors’ portfolios. Such 
competitive effects are consistent with the findings of Wengner et al. (2015). 
 
(b) If NE is B-rated: 
H1: Contagion effect (+ve): A common and positive spillover could arise because the 
upgrade is indicative of potentially improving economic circumstances for both 
higher and lower rated countries in the region i.e. a revision of market expectations. 
 
H2: Competition effect (-ve): We anticipate a negative spillover effect whereby flows 
of funds are attracted away from B-rated sovereigns i.e. investors adjust their 
portfolios. 
 
E is B-rated (a) If NE is also B-rated: 
H1: Contagion effect (+ve): A positive spillover effect is anticipated. The upgrade is 
perceived to indicate strengthening economic circumstances for lower rated 
sovereigns and to attract flows of funds to such countries. Christopher et al. (2012) 
find that sovereign credit signals positively affect regional stock market integration. 
Rating upgrades provide benefits for surrounding countries in a region. Kim and Wu 
(2011) highlight that improvements to the sovereign ratings in one region draw G7 
bank inflows away from the other world regions. 
 
H2: Competition effect (-ve): i.e. B-rated NE stock markets will be negatively 
affected. This draws from the assumption that funds will flow out from the NE 
markets and are reinvested in the event country due to its new higher relative standing 
(a portfolio shift by investors). 
 
(b) If NE is A-rated: 
H1: Contagion effect (+ve): A common and positive spillover could arise because the 
upgrade is indicative of potentially improving economic circumstances for higher 
rated countries in the region, i.e. a revision of market expectations. 
 
H2: Competition effect (-ve): We do not anticipate any strong spillover. We propose 
that there are no likely competition effects in this upgrade channel i.e. A-rated 







4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
 The analysis focuses on the Europe and Central Asia (EU-CA) region, as defined by 
the World Bank. This region is of particular interest due to the European sovereign debt crisis, 
and it is the region with the greatest intensity of CRA sovereign actions (i.e. rating actions per 
sovereign) during the time period of interest. Additionally, in pursuing our research questions 
relating to competition versus contagion spillovers, it is necessary to focus upon groups of 
countries where such effects are plausible (see below). Prior literature has shown that spillover 
effects tend to be stronger within regions and between neighbouring countries (e.g. 
Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). For example, there is clear 
evidence of potential contagion effects between core and peripheral Eurozone countries during 
the European sovereign debt crisis (e.g. Abad and Chulia, 2016). Extending the region beyond 
the European Union (EU) enables a more credible analysis of another of our research questions, 
namely to differentiate the spillover effects between ‘high rated’ and ‘low rated’ countries, as 
defined in Section 3. Finally, the research questions surrounding split ratings and rating 
convergence can be addressed more thoroughly by including a larger sample of countries from 
the middle-income level (as defined by the World Bank) which tend to fall into our defined ‘B’ 
group. 
The spillover of rating news can be transmitted across EU-CA countries because of 
their real and financial linkages. Dornbusch et al. (2000) explain that trade links, regional 
patterns, liquidity constraints and macroeconomic similarities facilitate the spillover of a shock 
(e.g. rating actions in this study) across countries. The European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) links 28 EU state members, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland. The 
European Economic Area (EEA) unites the EU Member States and the EFTA States (except 
for Switzerland which has a series of bilateral agreements, including a free trade agreement 
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with the EU) into a single market governed by the same rules, which enables the free movement 
of goods, services, capital and people. In addition, the 19 Eurozone member countries are 
strongly linked by the joint monetary policy transmission mechanism, the Eurosystem’s 
collateral framework, and the shared default risk of Eurozone member countries via the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) 
(see Alter and Beyer, 2014). Further, EFTA has free trade agreements with non-EU countries 
in our sample including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and 
Ukraine, while there are ongoing free trade negotiations with Kazakhstan and Russia.11 The 
EU has also co-operated with Central Asian countries in order to strengthen economic relations 
and trade e.g. through the EU Generalised System of Preferences. Preferential frameworks exist 
to encourage exports, economic diversification, and improved regional cooperation with these 
countries (World Bank, 2017). 
The stock market data comprises daily equity indices and is collected from Bloomberg.  
There are 39 countries included in the sample and the time period is from August 1994 to 
October 2015. Where a country’s stock index data is not available for the whole sample period, 
the start date is indicated in the Appendix (all countries’ data ends in October 2015). In cases 
where Bloomberg provides more than one equity index for a given country, we select the index 
which is consistent with Afonso et al. (2012). The sample includes 14 countries not analysed 
by Afonso et al. (2012). For five of these countries, Bloomberg provide more than one index 
and in these cases, we select the headline index. The Appendix provides the summary statistics 
for the two-day cumulative event return spread over the benchmark (defined beneath Equation 
(1) below).12 
                                                          
11 For more details, see http://www.efta.int.  
12 All cases with ‘extreme’ values have been checked. For example, some of the extremes occur during the 
Icelandic financial crisis (October 2008), the Russian financial crisis (September 2008), and the Turkish liquidity 
and banking crisis (December 2000). 
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 The analysis is focused upon the sovereign rating sector (with justification for this 
provided in Section 2’s review of the prior literature). Daily data on sovereign rating actions 
by Fitch, Moody’s and S&P is collected directly from the CRAs’ publications. The data 
includes information on the rating level, rating outlook and rating watch status.13 The reason 
for starting the sample period on 10th August 1994 is that Fitch did not assign sovereign watch 
until that year.14 The rating opinion (including the rating, outlook and watch) must be converted 
to a numerical scale. To incorporate outlook and watch, we employ a comprehensive credit 
rating (CCR) which is mapped to a 58-point scale (discussed in Sy, 2004) which has become 
widely used in the related literature, as follows: AAA/Aaa = 58, AA+/Aa1 = 55, AA/Aa2 = 52 
… CCC-/Caa3 = 4, CC/Ca, SD-D/C = 1, and we then add ‘+2’ for positive watch, ‘+1’ for 
positive outlook, ‘-1’ for negative outlook, ‘-2’ for negative watch, and ‘0’ for stable outlook. 
This also enables the quantification of differences of CCR opinion between CRAs on each day, 
which is termed as the split rating (e.g. Vu et al., 2015). A rating action is defined as any daily 
change in CCR for a given CRA for a given sovereign.  
Table 1 presents the distribution of CCR changes (upgrades and downgrades in the 
rating opinion) for each country during the sample period. Only one of the 39 sampled countries 
has no rating actions during the time period (Switzerland). The sample includes a total of 1184 
actions, which compares well with the data samples in the related literature. It is evident that 
the highest numbers of CCR actions are observed for Greece, Ireland, Russia, Turkey and 
Ukraine.  
                                                          
13 CRAs use outlook and watch signals to mitigate the tension between rating accuracy and rating stability (e.g. 
Hamilton and Cantor, 2004). The outlook status reflects the medium-term outlook for the rating and can be stable, 
negative, positive or developing. The watch status reflects a shorter-term expectation for the rating and can be 
negative, positive or developing. If a ‘watch’ status is in place, this replaces the prior outlook status. Section 2 
explains the importance of outlook/watch for financial market reactions to CRA actions. 
14 In 1989, S&P was the first CRA to start applying outlook/watch to its sovereign ratings. Moody’s started using 
sovereign watch signals in 1991, while outlooks came into extensive use in 1995. Fitch began to assign outlook 
to sovereign ratings in September 2000. 
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 Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the annual average CCR ratings of the A-rated 
and B-rated groups over the entire sample period and for four sub-periods: (i) 1994 to 2000, 
(ii) 2001 to 2006, (iii) 2007 to 2010 and (iv) 2011 to 2015. The A-rated group has an average 
rating of 52.6 (approx. AA/Aa2), with a standard deviation of 0.6, while the B-rated group has 
an average rating of 27.3 (approx. BB+/Ba1) with a standard deviation of 1.1. The low average 
rating for the B-rated group in the 1994-2000 period is attributable to the Asian and Turkish 
crises. During the 2001-2006 period, the slightly lower (higher) average rating for group ‘A’ 
(‘B’) reflects that many European emerging countries were upgraded to the A-rating level 
(BBB-rating level) at the bottom (top) of the range in that group. During the 2007-2010 period, 
many European countries were downgraded to the bottom range of group ‘A’ rating or the top 
range of group ‘B’ rating, which explains the slightly higher (lower) average rating for group 
‘B’ (‘A’). 
There are several cases where multiple countries are upgraded/downgraded by a given 
CRA on the same day. Excluding these cases enables cleaner analysis of the ‘A’ and ‘B’ groups, 
because there are some cases where both ’A’ and ‘B’ sovereigns are upgraded/downgraded by 
the same CRA on the same day. Therefore, the overall quantification of the spillover effects 
errs on the conservative side. On re-estimation including all cases, the inferences are not 
affected. Figure 3 demonstrates the pattern of actions across the time dimension. The highest 
concentrations of CCR actions are observed in 2001-3 (which are dominated by positive 
actions) and in 2008-12 (which are dominated by negative actions).15 The former is partly 
attributable to positive developments in European emerging markets, while the latter is 
evidently the global financial crisis period. 
In relation to the hypotheses discussed in the previous Section 3, Table 3 presents the 
distribution of CCR actions (whereby multiple rating actions by a given CRA on the same day 
                                                          
15 These full statistics are available on request. 
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are excluded) across the defined ‘A’ and ‘B’ categories. Despite the global financial crisis, the 
number of upgrade actions exceeds downgrades. The ‘B’ group sovereigns have substantially 
more actions (549) than the ‘A’ group (237). This is to be expected due to higher rating 
volatility in the lower range of the rating scale, which is widely documented in CRA 
publications and in the literature on rating transitions (e.g. Bangia et al., 2002). 
The modelling approach discussed below takes into account the differences of opinion 
across CRAs on any given day. We follow two approaches to capture changes in CRAs’ split 
opinions arising from a given rating action, one of which focuses on inter-CRA differences 
(split ratings) and the other focuses on inter-country differences (rating 
convergence/divergence). The first approach involves identifying whether the split rating 
widens or narrows due to the rating action (the prior hypotheses for this were stated in Section 
3). The intention is to establish whether the changing disagreement between CRAs increases 
or reduces the effects of the rating action. The second approach involves quantifying the extent 
of rating convergence resulting from a given rating action i.e. to what extent a rating action 
draws that sovereign’s rating closer to those of other countries in its group (‘A’ or ‘B’ as 
defined above). This approach is original and novel in the rating literature, and uses the 
Euclidean distance (defined below Equation (3)). Greater rating convergence is hypothesized 
to reduce the surprise content of a rating action (see Section 3). 
Table 3 documents the distribution of pre-event split ratings and the preponderance of 
split-widening (W) and split-narrowing (N) rating actions. Table 3 identifies that split ratings 
are a prevalent phenomenon in sovereign ratings during this sample period. This provides 
further justification for incorporating information on split ratings within the methodology. For 
downgrades, the mean split is typically around five CCR points, which is close to two rating 
notches. In contrast, upgrades tend to be applied to cases with narrower splits of around 3.7 
CCR points on average. Similarly, the maximum split is larger for countries facing downgrades 
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(20 CCR points versus 15). Cases of split-widening and split-narrowing actions are evenly 
balanced at 35% of rating events for the whole sample. The “B” rated group demonstrates 
stable percentages in different cases of downgrade / upgrade and widening / narrowing. Split-
widening downgrades are 46% of rating downgrades for the “A” rated group and split-
narrowing upgrades are 41% of cases for this group. Split-widening upgrades are only 25% of 
rating upgrades in the “A” group.  
The high percentages of disagreement between CRAs on their assessment of the 
creditworthiness of EU-CA countries can be partly explained by increases in sovereign 
opacity.16 During the European debt crisis (especially between 2010 and 2013), there was a 
wave of negative sovereign rating actions (although not simultaneous across CRAs), which 
resulted in persistent split ratings for many high-rated countries in Europe. It became more 
challenging for CRAs to determine the amounts and recoverability of the loss to investors from 
holding sovereign debt (e.g. debt issued by Greece, Ireland and Portugal). The strong 
interdependence among EU countries made the assessment of cross-border debt holdings and 
potential spill-over effects more difficult. Also, there were and still remain differences of 
opinion across CRAs about EU countries’ prospects for economic growth and their support for 
domestic banking systems. After 2013, several EU countries still faced major challenges, 
including large amounts of public debt and restrictive financing conditions. In these 
circumstances, split ratings are more likely to occur. Further, political uncertainty in the EU-
CA region has been a major issue during the latter part of our sample period. This includes 
challenging political dynamics in Greece and Turkey, the rise of new political parties e.g. in 
Poland, Portugal and Spain, and conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The assessment of 
political issues usually involves subjectivity and ambiguity, and hence exaggerates the division 
                                                          
16 Vu et al. (2017) provide evidence of harsher split ratings between CRAs in countries in Europe and Central 
Asia than in the rest of the world during 1997 to 2011.  
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of credit opinions between CRAs. Further, CRAs encounter opacity in sovereign credit risk 
assessments when governments’ information disclosure, transparency and data quality are 
imperfect, which is the case for many countries in our sample, including Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Turkey. 
Table 4 presents summary data for the rating convergence measure. On this measure, 
downgrades have a strong tendency of creating divergence rather than convergence, especially 
for the “A” group. Upgrades produce markedly different consequences in the “A” and “B” 
groups, whereby convergence occurs in 78% of “A” group cases and only 43% of “B” group 
cases. 
 
4.2. Methodology  
 We now explain the methodology for identifying the competition versus contagion 
effects of rating actions upon the stock markets. We initially employ a ‘baseline’ model, which 
is then augmented to account for split ratings and rating convergence (separately). The models 
are estimated for downgrades and upgrades separately (which is a commonplace approach in 
the related literature due to the clarity of interpretation).  The models are estimated separately 
using the groups A and B of event-country and groups A and B of non-event countries. Further, 
the models are estimated separately for the full sample and for the global financial crisis period 
(defined as 2007-2015). 
 The baseline model is specified as: 
𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐸 + 𝜑𝐶𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
(Eq. 1) 
E refers to the event country i.e. the sovereign rating for which CCR has changed on day t. NE 




𝑁𝐸 is the cumulative returns spread of the non-event countries for the event day t. All non-
event countries are included in the estimation for the periods for which their stock index data 
is available. It is defined using a two-day window and employing a benchmark index.17 
∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 is the absolute value18 of the maximum change19 in the 58-unit comprehensive credit 
rating (CCR) across S&P, Moody’s and Fitch on day t. 20 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝐸  is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there are any other rating action(s) taken 
on the event country by different CRA(s) during the two-week interval [-14,-1] (calendar days) 
before the rating action under consideration. This is widely used in prior literature with the aim 
of capturing any contamination, but is an infrequent event (there are only eight cases in total 
when this variable equals 1). 
𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the CBOE Volatility index (from Bloomberg), which is included to control for 
prevailing global risk (as in many previous papers e.g. Vu et al., 2015).21 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐸  (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐸) is the size of the event (non-event) economy measured in US dollar GDP 
(annual) in the previous year (collected from the World Bank).  
C is a series of country dummy variables to control for any country-specific effects and Y is a 
series of time dummies, which are included to account for any time effect. We consider four 
                                                          
17 𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑡
















𝑀 ). M represents the benchmark market 
index. 
18 i.e. the absolute value is used in the models for downgrades in order to ease the interpretation, relative to the 
competing hypotheses in Figures 1 and 2. 
19 ‘Maximum’ refers to the potential for more than one CRA taking a rating action on the same sovereign on day 
t. This is very rare in the sample. 
20 To address possible non-linearity in the rating scale, we also estimate Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) using the rating event 
variable ‘∆𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸’ instead of ‘∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸’. ∆𝐿𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 is the absolute value of the maximum change in a logit-type 
transformation of the 58-point numerical rating scale (LCCR), across S&P, Moody’s and Fitch on day t, as 
follows. LCCRt = ln [CCRt / (59 - CCRt)], where CCRt is the rating according to the 58-point numerical rating 
scale (see Sy, 2004). The results, available upon request, are consistent with those reported in Tables 5-7. 
21 Motivated by Ehrmann et al. (2011), we also used alternative specifications which controlled for large events 
in the US stock market that could affect the European stock markets. This involved a dummy variable set equal 
to 1 for days with extreme values of S&P500 absolute returns (in the upper 10% of the distribution) and zero 
otherwise. The inferences from Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) are robust when adding this dummy variable and when 
replacing the VIX index variable with this dummy variable (results available on request). 
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periods: a) from 1994 to 2000, b) from 2001 to 2006, c) from 2007 to 2010 and d) from 2011 
to 2015. Only the latter two apply for the defined crisis period (2007-2015) results. 
For the return spread, the Eurostoxx (collected from Bloomberg) is employed as a 
suitable benchmark index because we are utilizing a sample of Europe-Central Asia countries.22 
The rating event dates are matched with non-event dates to further aid the robustness and 
interpretation of results. This approach was instigated by Gande and Parsley (2005) and 
Ferreira and Gama (2007). It has been very widely employed subsequently in this branch of 
credit rating literature (e.g. Brooks et al., 2015). Specifically, to estimate the stock market 
reaction to a rating action, a country-matched random sample (with replacement from the 
original time series excluding the observations within a one-month window centered in each 
event day) of non-event days is added to the sample of event days.23 Hence, the number of 
observations in the estimated models is double the number of rating events relevant to that 
specification. 
 The augmented second model accounts for the widening or narrowing in the split rating 
as a consequence of the rating action, and is specified as: 
    𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽2𝑊𝑆𝑡
𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑁𝑆𝑡
𝐸 ∗ 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝐸 +
                        𝛽5𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐸 + 𝜑𝐶𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                   (Eq. 2) 
𝑊𝑆𝑡
𝐸 (𝑁𝑆𝑡
𝐸) is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the event-country sovereign ratings 
are unequal (split) on the day prior to the rating action (t – 1) and the rating action causes the 
split to widen (narrow) i.e. 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 (𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1). 
                                                          
22 There is some variation in the closely related prior literature regarding the use of a benchmark return. In the 
CDS and foreign exchange markets, several studies use the raw returns rather than adjusted return (e.g. Drago and 
Gallo, 2016; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). In the stock and bond strands of the related literature, there is a 
tendency to regard the use of a benchmark return as necessary (e.g. Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015; Jorion and 
Zhang, 2010). The wider event study literature overwhelmingly uses a benchmark or expected return in stock 
market studies. 
23 The sample is adjusted for outliers using trimming at the extreme 5% tails. 
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 The augmented third model accounts for rating convergence or divergence within the 
‘A’ and ‘B’ rated groups. The hypothesis is that rating actions that result in convergence have 
lesser spillover impact within the group (refer to Section 3). The model is specified as: 
        𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝐸 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝐸 + 𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐸 +
                                 𝛽6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐸 + 𝜑𝐶𝑡 + 𝜌𝑌𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                (Eq. 3) 
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝐸 is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the rating action produces a lower value 




𝐸 is a novel and original measure not previously applied in the related literature. It is 
calculated as the Euclidean distance between the CCR level of the event country and the 
average of the sovereign CCR levels in the event country’s group (“A” or “B” as defined above) 
on a given day, considering the three agencies: 
𝐶𝐼𝑡
𝐸 = √(𝑆𝑃𝑡
𝐸 − 𝑆𝑃̅̅̅̅ 𝑡)2 + (𝑀𝑡
𝐸 − ?̅?𝑡)2 + (𝐹𝑡
𝐸 − ?̅?𝑡)2  
𝑆𝑃𝑡
𝐸 , 𝑀𝑡
𝐸  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐹𝑡
𝐸 are the CCR of the event country on a given day, assigned by Standard & 
Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch respectively. 𝑆𝑃̅̅̅̅ 𝑡, ?̅?𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̅?𝑡 are the average of the S&P, Moody’s 












5. Empirical Results 
 Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) for the whole sample and for the 
crisis period sample. Panel A presents the results for rating downgrades. The results reveal a 
clear pattern whereby downgrades of A-rated countries induce contagion to both A-rated and 
B-rated countries, while downgrades of B-rated countries reveal the opposite i.e. they induce 
competitive effects. These unique findings are strongly significant and robust across different 
specifications, including the restriction of the sample to the crisis period as presented. The 
coefficients for ∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 are generally large. Specifically, a negative outlook action (1-CCR 
point downgrade) of an A-rated country is associated with a negative abnormal return of 12.3 
and 22.7 basis points (bps) for A-rated and B-rated non-event countries respectively. The effect 
is slightly stronger (14.9 and 25.1 bps) during the crisis period. On the other hand, positive 
abnormal returns of 5 and 5.9 bps for B-rated and A-rated non-event countries are observed 
following a 1-CCR point downgrade of B-rated countries during the crisis period. These results 
imply that the effect of the contagion cases is broadly somewhat stronger than for the 
competition cases. Our findings suggest that stock markets of non-event countries are subject 
to both contagion and competition effects of negative rating signals depending on the rating 
level of the country which experiences a rating action. For the A- to A-rated contagion and B- 
to B-rated competitive effects, the findings are consistent with those presented by Jorion and 
Zhang (2010) in a corporate context. 
The presence of very recent prior rating actions is only significant during the crisis 
period, as may be anticipated due to the increased intensity of rating activity at that time. The 
coefficients on the VIX index are significantly negative during the crisis period, consistent with 
negative stock market returns at that time, when the VIX index was elevated. The size (GDP) 
of the event country only has a significant coefficient in the A-rated event country samples, 
suggesting that the reactions of non-event countries’ stock market returns are stronger 
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following the downgrades of larger A-rated countries than smaller ones. The size of the non-
event country has no significant influence. 
Panel B of Table 5 presents the equivalent results for rating upgrades. There is a very 
minimal spillover impact of upgrades.  The only case of a significant ∆CCR coefficient is from 
A-rated to A-rated, which reflects a competition effect. Good rating news for an A-rated 
sovereign has a negative consequence for other A-rated countries in the region. A positive 
outlook signal for A-rated country causes a negative abnormal return of 3.9 bps for other A-
rated countries. The coefficient is smaller than all but one in Panel A. Also, the effect is not 
present when the sample is restricted to the crisis period. Apart from the ‘A to A’ case, the null 
hypothesis of no spillover holds. The coefficients on the VIX index are mixed, and there is no 
clear pattern in the event country GDP coefficients. Smaller non-event countries face negative 
returns in the crisis period, as would be expected. 
The results of Table 5 are consistent with prior studies which show that negative rating 
events cause significant spillovers to other countries’ equity markets, while positive rating 
signals have limited or insignificant impact (e.g. Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Sy, 2004; 
Ferreira and Gama, 2007; Hill and Faff, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012; Drago and Gallo, 2016). As 
a consequence of the findings in Panel B of Table 5, the remaining results tables and discussion 
focus on the cases of downgrades only. The key results observed in Table 5 for the effects of 
rating downgrades are maintained in Tables 6 and 7 when additional variables are introduced. 
As in Table 5, the coefficients on prior events and on the VIX index remain significant with 
anticipated signs for the crisis period results in Tables 6 and 7. 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating Equation (2) for the whole sample and for the 
crisis period sample. In general, pre-event split ratings accentuate the contagion and 
competition effects. This is in line with the findings of Alsakka et al. (2017) that pre-event split 
ratings influence the intensity of spillover effect of sovereign credit actions in the equity 
26 
 
markets of non-event countries. Some authors (e.g. Vu et al., 2015) argue that credit signals 
which widen split ratings induce more ambiguity about the creditworthiness of the sovereign 
and therefore cause stronger market impact. In contrast, we do not find a clear differentiation 
in the impact of downgrades of A-rated sovereigns that widen or narrow a split rating. Table 6 
shows that a negative rating action that widens (narrows) the split ratings across CRAs of A-
rated sovereign causes a negative abnormal return of 2.7 (2.9) bps for A-rated non-event 
countries and of 4.7 (3.0) bps for B-rated non-event countries.  
On the other hand, and consistent with our expectations, the competitive effect is 
relatively stronger for rating actions on B-rated sovereigns that widen rather than narrow the 
split across CRAs. A negative rating action that widens split ratings on a B-rated sovereign 
induces a positive abnormal return of 4.5 (3.7) bps for B- (A)-rated non-event countries. These 
are relatively larger than the positive abnormal return for B- (A)-rated non-event countries (2.2 
(3.2) bps) associated with a negative rating action that narrows the split ratings across CRAs 
for B-rated sovereigns. The influence of split ratings is weaker in the crisis period sample, 
when the ∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸 coefficients and their significance are much stronger than in the whole sample 
period. 
Table 7 presents the results of estimating Equation (3). In general, any rating 
convergence produces positive and significant coefficients regardless of the A-rated and B-
rated categorization. For the downgrades of A-rated sovereigns, rating convergence mitigates 
the contagion effect to other A-rated countries in the region, but has very limited effect on the 
contagion to B-rated countries. A 1-CCR point downgrade of an A-rated sovereign spills over 
to other A-rated countries leading to a negative abnormal return of 12.0 bps. However, if the 
rating event produces a convergence of ratings across CRAs, this leads to a positive abnormal 
return of 14.2 bps for A-rated non-event countries. On the other hand, a 1-CCR point 
downgrade of an A-rated sovereign spills over to B-rated countries, leading to a strong negative 
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abnormal return of 22.4 bps regardless of whether the event produces rating convergence across 
CRAs for the event country or not. This is logical given the variable construction. 
For the cases of downgrades of B-rated countries, rating convergence strengthens the 
competitive effect on other B-rated countries, but there is little effect of rating convergence on 
the spillover to A-rated countries. The abnormal return for B-rated countries is 36.4 bps 
following a negative action on a B-rated country that produces a convergence of ratings across 
CRAs only (i.e. no spill-over effect is evident in the case of no rating convergence). In 
comparison, a 1-CCR point downgrade of a B-rated sovereign leads to a positive stock market 
return of 4.0 bps for A-rated countries, but in the case that the rating event produces rating 
convergence, this leads to an additional (relatively stronger) positive abnormal return of 10.7 
bps for A-rated non-event countries.  
The results during the crisis period are consistent with the whole sample period. There 
are no previous research papers which offer any possibility of direct comparisons with the split 
rating and rating convergence results presented here. 
Further, following the methodology applied by Böninghausen and Zabel (2015) and 
Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), we add a Region dummy variable to Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) to 
account for the potential influence of differences in banking regulations and trade relations 
across the countries in our sample. The Region dummy variable takes the value of 1 if both the 
non-event and event countries belong to the same geographical region, and 0 otherwise.24 The 
robustness of the previous inferences is confirmed (results available upon request). The Region 
                                                          
24 We consider the following regions (see Böninghausen and Zabel, 2015): (i) Central Europe: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; (ii) Eastern Europe: Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Russia and Ukraine; (iii) Northern Europe: Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden; (iv) South Eastern 
Europe: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Turkey; (v) 
Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain; (vi) Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland and United Kingdom. 
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dummy suggests that spillover effects are more pronounced for rating actions from A to A rated 
countries within the same region.25 
 
6. Conclusions 
 The influence of CRAs’ actions upon financial markets has attracted close scrutiny 
since the global financial crisis. Sovereign rating actions have wide-ranging implications for 
economies and markets (e.g. Adelino and Ferreira, 2016; Almeida et al., 2017; Borenzstein et 
al., 2013; Brooks et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2013, 2016; Drago and Gallo, 2016; Kim and Wu, 
2011). A particular aspect deserving a detailed evidence base is the potential spillover effects 
from a sovereign rating action to other countries’ financial markets. In the recent context of the 
European sovereign debt crisis, one may perceive that negative (and common) spillovers across 
peripheral Eurozone countries are a dominant feature. In contrast, we may also envisage 
differential (competition) spillovers such as ‘flight to quality’ and ‘flight to liquidity’ effects 
of downgrades during the crisis period. In taking a longer run view across the Europe and 
Central Asia region, we consider both negative and positive spillovers, based on common 
(contagion) and differential (competition) effects of sovereign rating actions, with hypotheses 
drawing from a related literature which includes Gande and Parsley (2005) in the sovereign 
context and Jorion and Zhang (2010) in the corporate context. Competing hypotheses are set 
up for different types of rating actions. Importantly, we consider that different rating 
groups/levels influence whether contagion or competition effects are likely to dominate within 
specific spillover channels.  
One important issue which is absent in the closely related spillover literature is the 
influence of CRAs’ differences of opinion (split ratings) upon spillover effects. In addition, no 
                                                          
25 Eqs. (1), (2) and (3) are also estimated using a sub-sample that excludes Turkey and Kazakhstan, which are 
under different banking regulations than EU countries. Robust results are obtained (available upon request). 
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attention has been paid to rating convergence as a contributory factor in the strength of spillover 
effects. Incorporating both inter-CRA split ratings and inter-country rating convergence 
reinforces the paper’s positioning in the literature (as detailed in Sections 1 and 2). We examine 
spillovers in the stock market, motivated by the influence of the sovereign rating ceiling and 
sovereign-bank linkages (e.g. Almeida et al., 2017; Borenzstein et al., 2013). Böninghausen 
and Zabel (2015) contend that the results of previous sovereign rating event studies are not 
easily generalizable, and our different approach adds much to the evidence base. 
 This paper’s findings reinforce the importance of considering rating levels, split ratings 
and rating convergence within an analysis of the spillover effects of sovereign rating actions. 
Both contagion (common) and competition (differential) types of spillovers in stock market 
returns are evident across rating actions for high-rated and low-rated sovereigns. The results 
reveal a clear pattern whereby downgrades of A-rated countries induce contagion to both A-
rated and B-rated countries, while downgrades of B-rated countries reveal the opposite i.e. they 
induce competitive effects. These unique findings are strongly significant and robust across 
different specifications. Downgrade are found to produce far stronger spillover effects than 
upgrades. Several prior hypotheses on the directions of spillover are verified by these results.  
 Split ratings are found to intensify stock market spillover effects, although the impacts 
of split-widening and split-narrowing rating actions are not as differentiated as was anticipated. 
Strong findings are reported for the rating convergence element of the analysis, in that rating 
convergence/divergence across similarly-rated sovereigns has a meaningful influence on the 
spillover effects. For the downgrades of A-rated countries, rating convergence mitigates the 
contagion effect to other A-rated countries in the region, but has very limited effect on the 
contagion to B-rated countries. For downgrades of B-rated countries, rating convergence 
strengthens the competitive effect on other B-rated countries but has little effect on the 
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competitive impact on A-rated countries. The latter results are quite intuitive, yet no prior 
evidence exists on this. 
 Overall, this paper makes a clear and substantial contribution to the sovereign rating 
literature. The findings have implications for future research, especially on the influence of 
rating levels, split ratings and rating convergence. The results should be of interest to credit 
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Table 1. The distribution of CCR changes for each country 
 Down Up  Down Up 
Austria 4 2 Lithuania 17 32 
Belgium 10 6 Luxembourg 2 3 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
4 4 Macedonia 6 5 
Bulgaria 10 29 Malta 9 10 
Croatia 17 8 Montenegro 8 3 
Cyprus 34 16 Netherlands 4 4 
Czech Rep. 4 12 Norway 0 1 
Denmark 1 5 Poland 6 19 
Estonia 12 26 Portugal 27 15 
Finland 6 13 Romania 15 30 
France 11 0 Russia 34 41 
Germany 2 2 Serbia 7 6 
Greece 47 32 Slovakia 10 35 
Hungary 26 28 Slovenia 18 24 
Iceland 24 26 Spain 24 15 
Ireland 21 25 Sweden 4 12 
Italy 22 7 Turkey 29 41 
Kazakhstan 14 32 UK 8 2 
Latvia 20 29 Ukraine 40 27 
TOTAL:  1184               Downgrades:  557                   Upgrades: 627 
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of rating upgrades and downgrades by CCR points for each of 39 
countries included in the sample for August 1994 to October 2015. The reported events include multiple 
rating actions by a given CRA on the same day. Switzerland is the only sampled country which does 






Table 2. CCR evolution over time and across country groups 
 1994-2015 1994-2000 2001-2006 2007-2010 2011-2015 
A-rated Group      
Mean 52.55 52.96 52.19 52.50 52.50 
Max 53.63 53.63 53.24 53.07 53.52 
Min 50.80 52.11 51.18 51.80 50.80 
Std dev 0.61 0.47 0.59 0.33 0.67 
Median 52.61 53.14 52.29 52.52 52.80 
      
B-rated Group 
    
Mean 27.29 26.79 27.30 28.37 27.03 
Max 29.64 29.11 29.58 29.64 28.65 
Min 24.87 24.96 25.36 26.99 24.87 
Std dev 1.14 1.02 1.21 0.81 0.78 
Median 27.24 26.86 27.28 28.41 27.13 
 Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the annual average CCR ratings of the A-rated and B-rated 
groups across the 39 sovereigns included in the sample over the entire sample period and for four sub-
















 Table 3. CCR and split rating distributions for days immediately preceding event days 
 




















B group 232 4.93 4.99 18 20 84 36% 80 34% 
A group 117 5.15 4.75 20 17 54 46% 36 31% 
Total 349 5.00 4.91 20 20 138 40% 116 33% 




















B group 317 3.72 3.73 15 15 107 34% 117 37% 
A group 120 3.44 3.67 13 13 30 25% 49 41% 
Total 437 3.65 3.71 15 15 137 31% 166 38% 
Total credit events 
 


















B group 549 4.23 4.26 18 20 191 35% 197 36% 
A group 237 4.28 4.20 20 17 84 35% 85 36% 
Total 786 4.25 4.24 20 20 275 35% 282 36% 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of CCR actions (whereby multiple rating actions by a given CRA on 
the same day are excluded) across the defined ‘A’ and ‘B’ categories for the 39 sovereigns included in 
the sample for August 1994 to October 2015. The Table also presents the distribution of pre-event split 
ratings and the preponderance of split-widening (W) and split-narrowing (N) rating actions. The rating 
action on date t widens (W) the split when the split after the rating action (𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡) is larger than the split 
on the day prior to the rating action (𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) i.e. 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1. The rating action on day t narrows 
(N) the split when the split after the rating action (𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡) is smaller than the split on the day prior to 
the rating action (𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1) i.e. 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡 < 𝑆𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑡−1. ‘%’ reflects the split-widening (W) and split-
narrowing (N) rating actions as a percentage of the total number of downgrades, upgrades or total 






Table 4. Convergence index on event days: Summary statistics 
 














B group 14.85 45.44 105 46% 126 54% 
A group 10.44 22.86 31 26% 86 74% 














B group 12.34 39.23 137 44% 179 56% 
A group 11.38 22.92 94 78% 26 22% 














B group 13.40 45.44 242 44% 305 56% 
A group 10.91 22.92 125 53% 112 47% 
 
Table 4 presents summary data for the Rating Convergence Index (CI) for the 39 sovereigns included 
in the sample for August 1994 to October 2015. CONV occurs when the rating action on day t produces 
a convergence, i.e. a lower value of the convergence index (CI) for the event country (𝐶𝐼𝑡
𝐸 < 𝐶𝐼𝑡−1
𝐸 ). 
DIVER is when the rating action on day t produces a divergence, i.e. a larger value of the convergence 
index (CI) for the event country (𝐶𝐼𝑡
𝐸 > 𝐶𝐼𝑡−1
𝐸 ). CI is calculated as the Euclidean distance between the 
CCR level of the event country and the average of the sovereign CCR levels in the event country’s 
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Table 5. Results of the estimation of Equation (1) 
Explanatory Variables Whole sample Crisis sample     
 A – A  A – B  B – B B – A  A – A  A – B  B – B B – A      

















































































































   
Time & country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
   
No of observations 8385 5134 6390 10146 3368 2885 4582 5724  
   
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.05  
   






Table 5. Continued  
Explanatory Variables Whole sample Crisis sample 
 A – A  A – B  B – B B – A  A – A  A – B  B – B B – A  












































































































Time & country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 8311 4338 6831 12683 2239 1627 3272 3755 
R-squared  0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.04 
 
Note: The table reports the results of Eq. (1). The dependent variable is 𝐶𝑅𝑆𝑡
𝑁𝐸 which measures, in basis points, the cumulative return spread of the non-event 
country on day t, against Eurostoxx. The independent variables are defined as follows. ∆𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑡
𝐸  is the credit event variable, measuring the absolute value of the 
maximum change in the CCR for event-country on event date t. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑡
𝐸 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there are announcement(s) made on the 
event country by other CRAs during the two-week interval [-14,-1] (calendar days) before the event. 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡  is the CBOE Volatility index. 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝐸  (𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑁𝐸) is the 
event (non-event) country size measured in US dollar GDP in the previous year (from the World Bank). We control for the fixed-effects of country and time by 
adding a full set of country dummy variables and four time dummy variables: i) from 1994 to 2000, ii) from 2001 to 2006, iii) from 2007 to 2010 and iv) from 
2011 to 2015. We estimate Eq. (1) separately for positive events and negative events, for four-way comparisons across the A- and B-rated groups. We apply 





Table 6. Results of the estimation of Equation (2) – Rating downgrades only 
 
Explanatory Variables Whole sample Crisis sample  






















































































































































Time & country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
No of observations 8385 5134 6390 10146 3368 2885 4582 5724  
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.11 0.14 0.04 0.05  
Note: See Table 5 for further details. 𝑊𝑆𝑡(𝑁𝑆𝑡) is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the sovereign has a split rating on day t-1 (i.e. different CRAs assign  





Table 7. Results of the estimation of Equation (3) - Rating downgrades only 
Explanatory Variables Whole sample Crisis sample 





























































































































Time & country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No of observations 8385 5134 6390 10146 3368 2885 4582 5724 
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.05 
Note: See Table 5 for details. 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑉𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the rating change produces a lower value in the convergence index (CI) of 







Figure 3. Evolution of rating downgrades and upgrades  
This figure includes data for the 39 sovereigns in the sample. The data is based on all actions i.e. rating, 















Appendix: Summary statistics for national stock market indices  
Country Index Sample from Mean SD Max Min 
Austria ATX 01-94 0.0034 0.0146 0.1358 -0.1690 
Belgium BEL20 01-94 0.0082 0.0126 0.1480 -0.1434 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
BIRS 05-04 -0.0540 0.0219 0.1050 -0.1308 
Bulgaria SOFIX 10-00 0.0660 0.0253 0.2881 -0.1999 
Croatia CRO 06-02 -0.0075 0.0184 0.1736 -0.1843 
Cyprus CYSMMAPA 09-04 -0.2008 0.0356 0.2554 -0.2028 
Czech Republic PX 04-94 -0.0218 0.0173 0.1226 -0.1500 
Denmark KFX 01-94 0.0542 0.0141 0.1755 -0.1556 
Estonia TALSE 06-96 0.0682 0.0254 0.2367 -0.2564 
Finland HEX 01-94 0.0347 0.0192 0.1745 -0.1767 
France CAC 01-94 0.0037 0.0123 0.1482 -0.1465 
Germany DAX 01-94 0.0308 0.0136 0.1532 -0.1764 
Greece ASE 01-94 -0.0349 0.0249 0.1430 -0.1874 
Hungary BUX 01-94 0.0783 0.0218 0.1820 -0.2359 
Iceland ICEXI 01-94 0.0243 0.0291 0.1273 -1.2251 
Ireland ISEQ 01-94 0.0206 0.0153 0.1593 -0.1459 
Italy FTSEMIB 12-97 -0.0219 0.0139 0.1472 -0.1126 
Kazakhstan KZKAK 07-00 0.1062 0.0334 0.4808 -0.5061 
Latvia RIGSE 01-00 0.0805 0.0241 0.1763 -0.2350 
Lithuania VILSE 01-00 0.0738 0.0189 0.1658 -0.1206 
Luxembourg LUXXX 01-99 0.0058 0.0147 0.1025 -0.0953 
Macedonia MBI 12-04 0.0275 0.0258 0.1598 -0.1269 
Malta MALTEX 12-95 0.0386 0.0201 0.1510 -0.1252 
Montenegro MONEX20 03-03 0.1126 0.0280 0.1908 -0.1506 
Netherlands AEX 01-94 0.0080 0.0126 0.1632 -0.1516 
Norway OBX 01-96 0.0578 0.0153 0.1707 -0.1958 
Poland WIG 01-94 0.0262 0.0237 0.2191 -0.2368 
Portugal PSI20 01-94 -0.0135 0.0148 0.1468 -0.1320 
Romania BET 09-97 0.0687 0.0266 0.1826 -0.2190 
Russia CF 09-97 0.1051 0.0353 0.3994 -0.2949 
Serbia BELEX15 10-05 -0.0418 0.0240 0.1701 -0.1455 
Slovakia SKSM 01-94 0.0107 0.0258 0.3221 -0.1690 
Slovenia SBITOP 04-03 -0.0302 0.0190 0.0984 -0.0867 
Spain IBEX 01-94 0.0147 0.0141 0.1498 -0.1271 
Sweden OMX 01-94 0.0366 0.0143 0.1540 -0.1817 
Switzerland SMI 01-94 0.0158 0.0129 0.1428 -0.1608 
Turkey XU100 01-94 0.1855 0.0348 0.3355 -0.2298 
Ukraine PFTS 01-98 0.0392 0.0293 0.1938 -0.2007 
UK UKX 01-94 0.0004 0.0101 0.1359 -0.1474 
Note: The table presents the national stock market indices along with descriptive statistics of the 2-day 
event cumulative log return spread during the sample period available for each country. SD denotes the 
standard deviation. Means are multiplied by 100. The sample ends in October 2015 for all countries. 
 
 
